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Abstract 
Quechuan languages are known to have a three-way evidential distinction between 
direct, indirect and reported source of information (cf. Willett 1988; Aikhenvald 
2004). The Quechuan enclitic =mi  has previously been analysed e.g. as marking 
direct evidence and certainty (Weber 1986; Floyd 1997), or the ‘best possible 
ground’ for making an assertion (Faller 2002). However, neither of the to-date 
analyses is adequate for describing the meaning of the enclitic =mi in Tena Kichwa, 
a Quechuan variety spoken in the Ecuadorian Amazon. In this article, I discuss the 
properties of the Tena Kichwa =mi, and show that in this variety, the marker is best 
analysed not as an evidential, but as a marker of epistemic primacy.  
 
1. Introduction  
Tena Kichwa (QII1, Quechuan, Ecuador, henceforth TK) is an agglutinative, exclusively 
suffixing language, spoken in the Ecuadorian Amazon by 20 (Lewis 2015)  to 40 (Moseley 
2010) thousand people. TK has two main grammatical categories: verbs and nominals, each 
associated with a distinct set of derivational and inflectional markers. The word order tends 
towards SOV, but can vary due to discourse-related factors – a feature typical for Quechuan 
varieties (cf. e.g. Muysken 1995) Also alike other Quechuan languages, TK has a set of word-
final ‘free enclitics’, which can attach to hosts from all grammatical categories.   
Most Quechuan varieties exhibit an evidential distinction between direct, indirect and reported 
source of information (cf. Willett 1988; Aikhenvald 2004), marked by a subset of ‘free 
enclitics’ mentioned above. This article focuses on the semantic and pragmatic properties of 
the TK ‘free enclitic’ =mi. In other Quechuan languages, =mi has been analysed as a ‘direct 
evidential’ (e.g. Weber 1986; Floyd 1997; Hintz & Hintz 2014) or ‘best possible ground’ 
marker (Faller 2002) and was also claimed to encode speaker certainty (e.g. Weber 1986; 
Nuckolls 1993; Floyd 1997). None of these analyses, however, can account for the TK =mi. In 
this article, I propose that, rather than as a direct evidential, the TK =mi should be analysed as 
a marker of epistemic primacy (Stivers et al. 2011), encoding the speaker’s subjective 
perception of their ‘relative right to know’ (Stivers et al. 2011: 13). 
The structure of this article is as follows: first, I introduce the notions relevant to the subject 
matter, discussing the distinctions within the evidential domain and the notion of epistemic 
primacy. Secondly, I describe the evidential system typical of Quechuan languages and show 
how the TK system differs from the Quechuan paradigm. Thirdly, I focus on the enclitic =mi. 
                                                 
1 According to the classification put forward by Torero (1964), Quechuan languages can be divided into two 
subgroups. Quechua I encompasses the varieties spoken in the Peruvian highlands, considered to be ‘the homeland 
of Proto-Quechua’ (Adelaar with Muysken 2004: 180-1). Quechua II (Torero 1964) includes all the remaining 
varieties. 
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I discuss its previous analyses and compare them with the TK data2, in order to show that it 
can be adequately analysed as an epistemic primacy marker. I conclude by discussing the 
implications of such analysis.  
2. Evidentiality and epistemic primacy  
In this section, I provide some background on the notions which I use in the analysis of TK 
=mi. Firstly, I discuss the issues pertinent to defining evidentiality. Secondly, I focus on 
epistemic primacy.  
2.1. Evidentiality 
This section provides some background on evidentiality as a cross-linguistic grammatical and 
semantic category. I mention some of the terminological issues that arose in the course of the 
development of scholarly interest in evidentiality and describe the different semantic 
distinctions made within taxonomy of evidence types.  
2.1.1. ‘Narrow’ and ‘broad’ definitions of evidentiality 
The concept of evidentiality – the linguistic marking of the source of information – as a 
semantic and grammatical category in its own right originates in the early 20th century from 
Franz Boas’ descriptive work on North American indigenous languages (cf. Boas 1911). 
However, it was over the last three decades that the body of descriptive and typological work 
on evidentiality has grown significantly (see e.g. Willett 1988; Aikhenvald & Dixon 1998; 
Aikhenvald 2004; de Haan 2013 for typological overviews). 
Early analyses defined evidential marking as encoding ‘attitudes toward knowledge’ (Chafe & 
Nichols 1986: vii) or a ‘range of epistemological considerations’ (Chafe 1986). Such 
understanding is tantamount to the ‘broad’ approach to evidentiality as encoding both the 
attitude towards, and the source of knowledge (cf. Chafe 1986), which implies intrinsic links 
between evidentiality and epistemic modality. In the literature on modality contemporary to 
early work on evidential systems, marking of the source of evidence was considered a subtype 
of epistemic modality (Palmer 1986; Willett 1988). The assumption that speakers are most 
committed to the truth of propositions for which they have direct evidence is intuitive, and true 
for most everyday situations. However, there are cases, such as those of religious beliefs or 
knowledge acquired from authority, where speaker’s commitment and direct evidence do not 
go hand in hand (cf. De Haan 1998; Faller 2002; Michael 2008).  
The mismatches between commitment to the truth of a proposition and access to direct 
evidence for it underpin a different tradition of looking at evidentiality, in which the epistemic 
and the evidential came to be regarded as two distinct types of propositional modality (Palmer 
2001; see also Boye 2012 on the category of ‘epistemicity’). Under such view, epistemic 
modality is related to the speaker’s judgements about the factual status of propositions. 
Evidential modality, on the other hand, indicates the evidence speakers have to support their 
                                                 
2 This article is based on data collected during two fieldtrips to the Napo Province, Ecuador in 2013 and 2014. 
The corpus resulting from the fieldwork amounts to 13h of naturalistic TK discourse, comprising different oral 
genres, as well as a corpus of over 23h of elicitation data.  
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statements (Palmer 2001: 8-9). The distinction between epistemic and evidential yields the 
‘narrow’ definition of evidentiality as only marking the source of information,  separate from 
epistemic judgement (Willett 1988: 54; Dendale & Tasmowski 2001: 342-3; Aikhenvald 
2004). In this article, I subscribe to this ‘narrow’ view of evidentiality.  
2.1.2. Taxonomy of evidence types 
The semantic  distinctions postulated within the narrowly defined domain of evidentiality are 
based on cross-linguistic surveys of evidential systems (cf. Willett 1988; Aikhenvald 2004). 
The taxonomy of source of evidence resulting from these surveys is shown in Figure 1 below: 
 
 
Direct  
Visual 
Auditory 
Other sensory 
 
 
Indirect 
 
Reported 
 
Hearsay 
Second-hand 
Third-hand 
Folklore 
 
Inferred 
Results (inference) 
Reasoning (conjecture) 
Figure 1: Taxonomy of sources of evidence 
 
The prediction this particular taxonomy makes about the possible evidential systems is that one 
marker cannot be used to code types of evidence that belong to different overarching types. For 
instance, we can expect a marker encompassing inference and reportative evidence, but the 
taxonomy does not predict a marker encoding both non-visual sensory and reportative 
evidence.  
As mentioned previously, most Quechuan languages make a distinction between direct, 
inferred (covering both inference and conjecture), and reported source of information. 
However, the data show that the TK cognates of evidential enclitics do not encode the source 
of information. They are better analysed as encoding a more subjective notion of epistemic 
primacy, which I discuss in the next section.  
2.2. Epistemic primacy 
As shown in the discussion above, the relationship between evidentiality and epistemic 
modality has been acknowledged and extensively discussed in the literature. More resent 
research suggests that both evidentiality and epistemic modality are related to a number of 
other categories which express meanings related to how both the speaker and the addressee 
relate to the information expressed by the utterance. These categories include egophoricity (cf. 
Hargreaves 2005; Dickinson 2016), mirativity (e.g. Dickinson 2000), engagement (e.g. Evans 
2016), construction of mutual knowledge (cf. Hintz & Hintz 2014) and a range of other 
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categories related to the ‘epistemic perspective’ of the speaker and/or the addressee (Bergqvist 
2015). The detailed discussion of the categories mentioned above is beyond the scope of this 
article. Nonetheless, it is important to mention that epistemic meanings which are neither 
evidential nor epistemic modal can be grammatically encoded. In my view, a satisfactory 
semantic description of the TK ‘evidential’ enclitics requires analysing them as markers of yet 
another epistemic category, namely, epistemic primacy.  
 
Epistemic primacy has been described as one of the dimensions of knowledge in interaction 
(cf. Stivers et al. 2011: 13), presented in Figure 2:   
 
 
(1) Epistemic access               (knowing vs. not knowing/ types of evidence/  
                                            degree of certainty) 
(2) Epistemic primacy           (relative right to know/ claim, authority of knowledge) 
(3) Epistemic responsibility   (obligations/ rights to have information) 
Figure 2 Dimensions of knowledge in conversation 
 
The three dimensions listed in Figure 2 correspond to the different ‘levels’ on which knowledge 
can be grounded in conversation. Evidentiality falls within the dimension of ‘epistemic access’, 
since it relates to the types of evidence for the proposition conveyed. Epistemic modality also 
falls within that domain, as related to the degree of certainty.  
 
The domain of epistemic primacy is more subjective than epistemic access. While epistemic 
access is concerned with the relationship between the proposition and the speaker, epistemic 
primacy has to do with the distribution of knowledge between participants of the speech event. 
Epistemic primacy is the asymmetry ‘in the depth, specificity or completeness’ of the speech 
act participants’ knowledge (Stivers et al. 2011: 13). Consequently, marking of epistemic 
primacy is grounded in the speaker’s subjective assessment of their knowledge state, rather 
than in how the speaker obtained the information. While epistemic primacy often arises as a 
result of having direct/best possible evidence for the information in question or being certain 
that the proposition is true, it needs not be grounded in those parameters.  
 
The third domain – epistemic responsibility – is related to the information that the speaker has 
an obligation or a right to know. For instance, it is expected of everyone to know their own 
name. On the other hand, there is information about other people, their internal states and 
experiences or private affairs, about which their interlocutors do not have a responsibility, or 
even right, to have information. This last domain is akin to Kamio’s (1997) ‘Territory of 
Information’ (henceforth ToI). The types of information which fall within one’s default ToI 
are (i) internal direct experience, (ii) information within one’s professional expertise, (iii) 
information obtained through external direct experience including verbal reports, and 
considered reliable, (iv) information about persons, object, events and facts in one’s close 
environment, (v) information about oneself (Kamio 1997: 18). One has right to all the 
information listed above, but also a responsibility to be familiar with them.  Other types of 
information can also become part of one’s ToI when they (Kamio 1997: 11-2), that is, 
integrated into one’s system of knowledge and beliefs. The pace at which this happens might 
depend on the type of information – more personal information tends to be absorbed sooner. 
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Faller (2002) describes a similar process as relevant to the integration of information into the 
Best Possible Ground in Cuzco Quechua. I discuss this concept in more detail in Section 3.1. 
Although this has not been discussed by the authors (cf. Stivers et al.), the domains of epistemic 
primacy and epistemic responsibility correlate with one another. It should be expected that if 
the speaker has epistemic primacy over some information, she also has an obligation, or right, 
to know.   
It is also important to notice that different types of clauses index different speech participants 
as sources of information (Bruil 2014: 44) - and therefore also as default candidates for holding 
epistemic primacy. In declarative clauses, the source of information corresponds to the speaker, 
and in interrogatives – to the hearer. Given that evidentiality and related categories can anchor 
to different speech participants in different types of clauses, rather using the term ‘speaker’, 
descriptions of epistemic systems should be referring to ‘origo’: “the person from whose 
perspective a given evidential is evaluated” (Garrett 2001: 15). In order to apply the term to 
other epistemic marking systems, this definition is broadened to designate “the person from 
whose perspective a given expression is evaluated” (cf. Bühler 1990; Mushin 2001). The 
process whereby the origo anchors to different participants in different clause types  is referred 
to in the literature as ‘origo shift’ (cf. Garrett 2001; Peterson 2010). 
Also importantly from the point of view of this article, declaratives and interrogatives differ 
from the imperatives in the type of ‘conversational update’ they provide. In Gricean 
pragmatics, the mismatch between declaratives and interrogatives on the one hand, and 
imperatives on the other is analysed in terms of differing ‘direction of fit’ between the words 
and the world (Searle 1976). In case of declarative and interrogatives, the direction of fit is 
from the words to the world – declarative and interrogative utterances need to match an 
independently existing state of affairs. In case of imperatives, the direction of fit is the opposite 
– from words to world – since the utterance of an imperative sentence is an attempt to influence 
a state of affair existing in the text-external world. 
These opposing directions of fit are associated with different types of origo authority over the 
information. In case of declaratives and interrogative clauses, the authority of the origo is 
epistemic – related to ‘knowing how the world is’, and indexed to the speaker and the 
addressee, respectively. In imperatives, the origo is the speaker and the type of authority she 
holds is deontic – associated with determining ‘how the world ought to be’  (Stevanovic & 
Peräkylä 2012: 298). Consequently, the notion of epistemic primacy/authority is only 
compatible with declarative and interrogative clauses.  
3. Evidentiality in Quechuan languages 
In this section, I provide a brief overview of evidential systems in Quechuan languages, and 
discusses the previous analyses of the enclitic =mi. I also introduce the Tena Kichwa set of 
‘evidential’ enclitics, with a view to providing a background for the ensuing discussion of the 
TK enclitic =mi. 
3.1. The Quechuan evidential paradigm 
Most of the described Quechuan varieties make a three-way evidential distinction between 
direct, inferential/conjectural and reported information source. These distinctions are marked 
by means of ‘independent enclitics’ which can attach to hosts from different grammatical 
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categories. The three-member evidential paradigm is illustrated below with examples from 
Cuzco Quechua, adapted from Faller (2002: 122): 
 
(1) Direct/best possible ground =mi 
 Para-sha-n=mi. 
 rain-PROG-3=mi 
 It is raining. [speaker sees that it is raining] 
 
(2) Conjectural =chá 
 Para-sha-n=chá. 
 rain-prog-3=chá 
 It is raining. [speaker conjectures that it is raining] 
 
(3) Reportative =si 
 Para-sha-n=si. 
 rain-PROG-3 =si 
 It is raining. [speaker was told that it is raining] 
 
The enclitic =mi was analysed by Faller (2002) as the marker of ‘best possible ground’ for 
making an assertion. The ‘best possible ground’ corresponds to direct evidence if the 
information in question belongs to the speaker’s own life experience. However, in case of 
encyclopaedic knowledge, which tends to be learnt from authority rather than through direct 
experience, the ‘best possible ground’ can correspond to reportative evidence.  
In most Quechuan varieties, the cognates of =chá are analysed as marking both inference and 
conjecture. However, in CQ the evidential meaning of =chá indicates that the speaker ‘bases 
his or her statement on a mental process’ (Faller 2002: 176). If the statement is based on partial 
direct evidence, the dubitative marker -chus hina is preferred (Faller 2006): 
 
(4)  
Context: Marya looks very pale. 
a. ?Unqu-sqa-chá   ka-sha-n-man 
 sick-PRT-CONJ   be-PROG-3-COND 
 She may be sick. 
 
b. Unqu-sqa-chus hina  ka-sha-n-man 
          sick-PRT-RES   be-PROG-3-COND  
 She appears to be sick. 
Faller 2007: 4  
The marker -chus hina/chu shina means roughly ‘I guess’, ‘I think’, ‘apparently’ (Faller 2006: 
3). Its distribution and translation suggest that it might function in similar contexts as the the 
=mi yachin (=mi seem-3SG) construction in TK, which I discuss in Section 4.3.2. 
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Although most Quechuan varieties described to date have three evidential enclitics, there are 
also exceptions to this rule. In TK, as well as Imbabura Quechua (QII, Cole 1982), the 
reportative marker is not attested. On the other end of the spectrum, South Conchucos Quechua 
(QI) is reported to have five evidential markers (Hintz 2012; Hintz & Hintz 2014), while Sihuas 
Quechua (QI, Hintz & Hintz 2014) and Huamalíes Quechua (QI, Howard 2012) have six.  
Prior to the evidential analysis, the markers in question were interpreted e.g. as ‘comment of 
clause’ (Parker 1969) or ‘validational’: indicating the speaker’s epistemic judgement about the 
conveyed information (Adelaar 1977; Cole 1982; Lefebvre & Muysken 1988). Since Weber’s 
(1986) study of the enclitics’ function in Huánuco Quechua (QI),  they have predominantly 
been analysed as evidentials (e.g. Weber 1986; Floyd 1997; Faller 2002; Hintz 2012; Howard 
2012). Nonetheless, in many Quechuan varieties, the ‘evidential’ markers do not fit in with the 
‘narrow’ definition of evidentiality as only marking the source of information. The enclitics in 
question have been interpreted as indicating the speaker’s source of information as well as: 
epistemic judgement (e.g. Weber 1986; Nuckolls 1993; Floyd 1997; Adelaar 1997), 
illocutionary force (Faller 2002; Nuckolls 2012), speaker subjectivity (Howard 2012; Nuckolls 
2012), or distinction between individual and shared knowledge (Hintz 2012; Howard 2012; 
Hintz & Hintz 2014). I come back to this issue in Section 5, where I discuss the proposed 
analysis of the TK =mi against the background of meanings encoded by evidential enclitics in 
other Quechuan varieties.  
3.2. The ‘evidential’ enclitics in Tena Kichwa 
As mentioned above, the TK ‘evidential’ markers comprise the ‘direct’ =mi and ‘indirect’ 
=cha, while the reportative enclitic is not attested. Hearsay/reportative information is 
introduced by a periphrastic construction combining =mi with the verb of speech (ni-):  
 
(5)  
rima  -wa    -n     Saida   ungu     -shka  =mi  siri  -k          ni    
-sha  
say   -1OBJ -3     NAME   fall.ill   -ANT  =mi stay-AG.NMLZ   say   -SS 
[They] tell me Saida is ill.  
el_25092014_01   113 
In (5)Error! Reference source not found., the =mi-marked complement clause is embedded 
under the main verb  rima- (‘talk’). The speech complement is introduced by the 
complementiser nisha (‘say-SS’). This reportative construction is akin to that attested in 
Imbabura Quechua (Cole 1982), spoken in the Ecuadorian Highlands.  The detailed discussion 
of the occurrences of =mi in embedded speech complements is beyond the scope of this article. 
However, the data suggests that such constructions can be analysed as containing an assertion 
made by the subject of the matrix clause, and presented, rather than asserted by the speaker in 
the utterances context (cf. Hooper & Thompson 1973; Krifka 2014; Faller 2014). 
 
The distribution of the ‘evidential’ markers =mi and =cha in the TK data shows no correlation 
between their presence and a particular source of evidence for the proposition they mark. The 
marker =mi can occur in utterances based on different types of evidence: 
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(6) Direct evidence 
tamya  -w      =mi 
rain     -PROG   =mi 
It is raining [speaker sees that it’s raining].  
el_18092014_01 003 
 
(7) Inference 
tuta   tamya -shka  =mi      (yachi   -n     ) 
night  rain    -ANT  =mi  (seem    -3SG) 
(It seems) it rained tonight. [speaker woke up in the morning to see the ground is wet] 
el_18092014_01   030 
 
(8)  Conjecture 
ñuka   yaya     shamu -w       =mi     (yachi   -n      ) 
1.PRO  father   come  -PROG=mi     (seem    -3SG) 
It seems my father is coming. [speaker hears footsteps outside, and was expecting his father to 
come home] 
el_18092014_01   035 
 
Example (6)Error! Reference source not found. is in line with the use of =mi in other 
Quechuan varieties, where the marker indicates that the speaker has direct, visual evidence. 
The use of =mi in the reportative construction in (5) Error! Reference source not found. 
could also be accounted for in evidential terms (cf. Faller 2002; 2014). The examples that put 
the best possible ground/direct evidential analysis of =mi into question areError! Reference 
source not found. (7) and (8), Error! Reference source not found.where =mi marks 
statements based on inferential and conjectural evidence.  
If the distribution of =mi and =cha in TK was similar to that in other varieties, we would expect 
that at least a conjectural statement could be marked with =cha. However, such an utterance is 
not felicitous in TK: 
 
(9)  
a. #tamia-w-n=dza 
            rain-PROG-3SG=cha  
  Intended meaning:   It is raining. / it must be raining. 
  [speaker hears noise on the roof, it sounds like rain] 
 
b.   tamia-w-n=dza? 
rain  -PROG-3SG=cha 
 Is it raining? 
elicited 
 
My consultants pointed out that while (9) is grammatical, it is not felicitous as an assertive 
utterance. They observed, however, that a =cha-marked utterance is felicitous in the same 
discourse context as a question or request for information, given in (9). Compare (9) with the 
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inferential statement in (7) above, and with analogous examples from Cuzco Quechua, cited in 
(10): 
 
(10)  
a. Para-sha-n-chá. 
 rain-PROG-3-CONJ 
 It is raining.  
  [It’s been raining the last few days, so speaker conjectures that it is/might be raining     
   now.] 
Faller 2007: 5 
 
b. Para-sha-n-chus     hina.  
 rain-PROG-3-DUB  
I think/guess it is raining.  
 [Speaker hear something that sounds like rainfall on the roof, but is not entirely sure  
   that it is rain.] 
Faller 2006: 3 
 
Utterance in (10) is based on conjecture, and (10) on inference/partial evidence. In TK, the 
utterance of (7) would be appropriate in both contexts. The =cha-marked utterance, as shown 
in (9), is only felicitous in this context as a request for information/confirmation. The meaning 
of the TK =cha will not be discussed further here, but the data presented above already suggest 
that it does not lend itself to the conjectural/inferential evidential analysis proposed for its 
cognates in other Quechuan varieties.  
Let us now come back to the inferential and conjectural clauses in Error! Reference source 
not found. and (8) above. As far as I am aware, the use of =mi in statements based on 
reasoning, or embedding =mi-marked clauses under an epistemic modal such as yachin (‘seem-
3SG’) has not been attested in other Quechuan varieties.  These examples also contradict the 
interpretation of =mi as a direct evidence marker or best possible ground (BPG) marker (cf. 
Faller 2002). The direct evidential analysis does not apply, since it was shown in the examples 
above that =mi can occur in utterances covering direct, indirect and reportative evidence. The 
marker also cannot be analysed as indicating BPG, since such an analysis would require that 
the speaker believes to have the BPG for making a statement, which is clearly not the case if 
she chooses to use =mi with the modal yachin (‘seem-3SG’) as in Error! Reference source 
not found.(7) and (8) above. However, if =mi is analysed as marker of epistemic primacy – 
‘the relative right to know or claim’ (Stivers et al. 2011: 13) – it can be reconciled with 
embedding under yachin. 
 In the discussion above, I have shown that the TK marker =mi can occur on statements 
covering different sources of evidence, which suggests it is not best analysed as an evidential 
marker. In Section 4, I develop an account of the meaning of =mi in TK and show that the 
distributions of the marker can be accounted for if it is analysed as encoding the origo’s 
epistemic primacy.   
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4. The TK enclitic =mi 
In the preceding section, I have shown that the ‘direct evidential’ analysis cannot be sustained 
for the TK =mi. Nonetheless, despite semantic differences, in discourse, the TK =mi in patterns 
similarly to its cognates from other varieties. The marker is not grammatically obligatory in 
any context in which it occurs, but it is required for the felicity of certain speech acts. In this 
section, I first discuss the analyses of =mi in other varieties. Secondly, I analyse the type of 
contribution the TK =mi makes to the utterance, and develop and account of the enclitic as a 
marker of epistemic primacy.  
4.1. Previous analyses of =mi  
The objective of this section is to provide context for the discussion of the TK =mi, and to 
show how its distribution and semantics differs from that of its cognates. For reasons of space, 
the discussion is limited to the most widely accepted analyses of the enclitic. 
Weber (1986) analyses the Huánuco Quechua (QI) =mi in as encoding the evidential meaning 
of ‘learnt by direct experience’. He claims that =mi can give rise to the implicature of certainty 
due to the Quechua cultural axiom whereby ‘(only) one’s own experience is reliable’ (Weber 
1986: 138). For Wanka Quechua (QI),  Floyd (1997) sees the direct evidential meaning of =mi 
as but one of the instantiations of its wider, validational meaning. Under his prototype-
theoretical analysis, the meaning of =mi as marking direct experience is a prototype within a 
primarily validational schema. That is, certainty is the most abstract, schematic meaning of 
=mi, which plays a role in all its uses, including the most common, prototypical one: marking 
of direct evidence. Floyd, alike Weber (1986) sees the prototypical meaning of =mi as derived 
from the fact that certainty is most often based on direct evidence.  
Faller (2002: chap. 4) points out that although such an axiom is intuitively correct, there are 
situations, such as mistaken perceptions, which call it into question. She also points out that 
=mi is often used to mark propositions which could not have been directly experienced by the 
speakers, such as future events, or internal states of others. Consequently, she develops the 
account of =mi as encoding the ‘best possible ground’ (henceforth BPG), for making an 
assertion, briefly discussed above. The BPG corresponds to different types of evidence 
depending on whether the information comes from the origo’s personal experience or forms 
part of general world knowledge. According to Faller, =mi is an illocutionary modifier 
affecting the sincerity conditions of the utterance. As such, it cannot be used if the speaker does 
not believe to have the BPG for his statement (cf. Faller 2002). In the sections that follow, I 
show that the analyses discussed above are only partially applicable to the enclitic =mi in TK.  
4.2. =mi and the proposition expressed 
According to previous studies, the meaning of the Quechua =mi is of the non-truth-conditional 
type. Although only Faller (2002) states this explicitly, analysing =mi as an illocutionary 
operator modifying the truth conditions of an utterance, other analyses of =mi mentioned in 
the previous section (cf. Weber 1986; Floyd 1997) also assume its non-truth-conditional 
meaning, although without explicit discussion.   
In the literature a test are standardly used to determine the type of meaning the marker/lexical 
item makes to an utterance is the challengeability/assent-dissent test (Faller 2002: sec. 3.5.3; 
Peterson 2010: sec. 3.5). It is based on the assumption that only the meaning of a truth-
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conditional element can be ‘questioned, doubted, rejected or (dis)agreed with’ (Faller 2002: 
110). In order to check whether the TK =mi is challengeable, I use examples analogous to those 
proposed by Faller for Cuzco Quechua (2002: 157-8).  Consider:  
 
(11)  
ñuka   yaya   shamu-w=mi 
1PRO father  come-PROG=mi 
My father is coming. 
 
If, as I hypothesised above, =mi is the marker of epistemic primacy, (11) could be challenged 
by a statement along the lines of (12): 
 
(12)  
Mana!  #Kan   mana  yacha-ngui=chu   chi-ta=ga  
 ! 
 NEG   2PRO  NEG  know-2=Q/NEG  D.DEM-
ACC=TOP 
 No! you don’t know that!  
 
Speakers find (12) infelicitous as a response to (11), which supports the claim that the semantic 
contribution of =mi to the clause cannot be challenged. A felicitous response is exemplified 
below: 
 
(13)  
Mana!   Shuj=mi a-n.  
NEG    one=mi COP-3 
No, it’s someone else! 
 
Utterance (13) relates to the event of the father coming, rather than to the speaker’s epistemic 
authority. The fact that (13), but not (12), is considered felicitous in this discourse context, 
supports the non-truth conditional analysis of the TK =mi. While further tests should be 
conducted to corroborate this conclusion, the results of the challengeability test indicate that 
the TK =mi can be analysed as a non-truth conditional.  
Faller (2002) has initially analysed the Cuzco Quechua =mi as an illocutionary modifier of 
sincerity conditions, basing this analysis on the fact that the enclitic was not embeddable, and 
scoped over propositional operators. More recent research has shown that illocutionary 
elements can also be embedded (e.g. Krifka 2014; Woods 2016), and in her more recent work 
Faller has also reconciled the fact that the CQ evidentials can embed in finite complement 
clauses with their analysis as illocutionary markers (Faller 2014).  
The examples in the previous sections have already shown that the TK =mi can embed under 
verbs of speech, as in example (5), and under the epistemic modal yachin (‘seem-3SG’), as in 
(7) and (8). As in case of CQ, the fact that the enclitic is embeddable does not necessarily 
contradict its illocutionary analysis.  
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Another scope property which the TK =mi shares with its cognates is that it can occur in 
declarative and interrogative clauses, but is ungrammatical in imperative clauses. Consider:  
(14)  
a. miku-y! 
 eat-2IMP 
 Eat! 
 
b.     *miku-y=mi! 
 eat-2IMP=mi 
 
The ungrammaticality of (14) is to be expected if =mi is analysed as a modifier of epistemic 
authority. As mentioned in Section 2.2, the authority held by the origo in imperative clauses is 
deontic, rather than epistemic. Hence, it is not surprising that imperative marking should be 
incompatible with epistemic authority modifiers. The fact that =mi is ungrammatical in 
imperative clauses also does not contradict its illocutionary analysis, since it is possible for 
illocutionary discourse markers to only be compatible with certain clause types (cf. Coniglio 
& Zegrean 2012). Therefore, the examples above show that alike its cognates from other 
Quechuan varieties, the TK =mi is non-truth conditional, and that it could be analysed as an 
illocutionary modifier. In the following section, I discuss the occurrence of =mi in declarative 
an interrogative clauses.  
4.3. The semantics of  =mi: claiming epistemic primacy 
In this section, I focus on the semantics of the TK =mi, showing that it can be analysed as a 
marker of the origo’s epistemic primacy. I discuss the distribution and meaning of =mi in main 
clause and in certain embedded contexts.  
4.3.1. =mi in main clauses 
It was shown in the discussion above that having direct evidence/best possible ground is not a 
necessary condition for the use of =mi in TK, which suggests that the enclitic does not encode 
an evidential meaning. Below, I support that observation with more examples:  
 
(15)  
Chi     rumira          paynami           churasha 
chi     rumi   -ta      payguna =mi       chura -sha    
D.DEM  stone  -ACC    3PL.PRO =mi     put     -SS   
 
chapanushka                chibi... 
chapa   -nu         -shka    chi   -pi 
wait    -3PL.SUBJ -ANT    D.DEM -LOC 
They have put this stone...they've waited having put it there... 
el_25092014_03   048 
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Example (15) comes from a conversation about the Pear Story (Chafe 1980). The speaker 
comments on the stone on the road, claiming that the three boys who appeared in the video put 
it there. This is a conjecture, since no such thing was shown in the film. Consequently, in other 
varieties of Quechua, Error! Reference source not found. would not have been marked with 
=mi. However, the speaker believes that he has just realised something about the story that 
might not be apparent to his interlocutor, and he uses =mi to index epistemic primacy. 
Similar examples come from a staged conversation about the results of Three Shell Games. As 
part of an elicitation session, two consultants watched video recordings of six games. First, 
they saw each game without the finale, and were asked to guess where the seed was. Then, they 
watched the same trick until the end, when the final location of the seed was revealed. 
Statements based on guesswork and conjecture are marked by indirect evidentials in other 
varieties and therefore I was expecting the speakers to use =cha.  However, =cha did not occur 
at all in the 10-minute recording (113 turns). Instead, the speakers’ guesses were mostly marked 
with =mi:  
 
(16)  
lluki      puramami             rin,    llukipurama 
lluki      pura -ma   =mi      ri -n    lluki     -pura  -ma 
left       side -DAT=mi      go -3SG   left       -side  -DAT 
[the steed] goes to the left, to the left…  
el_03102014_01   076 
 
(17)  
muyuwa  ajga                        chi         puramami    sakirin 
muyu-wa  a  -k =ga       chi         pura -ma   =mi  
 saki-ri          -n 
seed -INS  be-AG.NMLZ =TOP   D.DEM    side -DAT =mi        let   -
ANTIC -3SG 
the seed, the [one] that has the seed stays on this side 
el_03102014_01   115 
 
In both examples given above, the speakers have good grounds to think they perception could 
be mistaken; they have already watched several tricks and never guessed correctly. Their use 
of =mi goes against the analysis of the enclitic as marking best possible ground, since the 
speaker needs to believe having the BPG to use =mi (Faller 2002: ch.4). However, if =mi is 
analysed as a marker of epistemic authority, by using it each speaker makes a claims as to the 
‘depth, specificity or completeness of their knowledge’, which does not have to be based on 
direct evidence. By using the enclitic, the speaker is trying to convince the interlocutor that his 
insight is privileged and grants him the ‘primary right’ to assess the situation in the video (cf. 
Stivers et al. 2011: 13) 
The uses of =mi prototypical for other varieties, where the origo does have the BPG for making 
an assertion, are also accounted for if =mi is analysed as a marker of epistemic authority. Both 
BPG and epistemic authority can be claimed with respect to  information integrated in one’s 
system of beliefs, coming from direct experience, or learnt from authority (Faller 2002: chap. 
4). In TK, =mi also occurs in these cases:  
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(18)  
Chi-raygu    kuna-gama   wayusa  upi-shka  
 tuku-shka  
D.DEM-CAUSAL now-LAT  guayusa drink-ANT  become-
ANT 
tukuy  riksi-nawn,  wayusa  yapa   bali       -n     =mi. 
all  know-3PL  guayusa much  be.good-3SG=mi 
Because of this until now the drinking of the guayusa has been known (practiced) by all, 
guayusa is very good.  
KICHB07AGOPEDROCHIMBO2   072 
 
In (18), a community elder talks about the custom of drinking guayusa3. In the =mi-marked 
statement, the speaker invokes cultural knowledge about guayusa, alongside his personal 
experience.  
In declarative clauses, origo corresponds to the speaker. Therefore, evidential/epistemic 
markers are ‘anchored’ to the speaker and represent her point of view (cf. e.g. Bruil 2014; 
Bergqvist 2015). Consequently, it is to be expected that the marking of epistemic authority is 
redundant in first person singular subject clauses, where the speaker is entitled to ‘epistemic 
privilege’(cf. Dickinson 2016) by virtue of being the primary actor of the situation she narrates. 
Therefore, marking of origo’s epistemic authority in 1SUBJ clauses should either be 
ungrammatical or associated with pragmatically marked reading. The second case obtains in 
TK. Consider:  
 
(19)  
pagrachu-ni=mi   pay   shamu-shka-manda 
thank     -1SG=mi 3PRO come-ANT-ABL 
I thank him [the parish’s president] for having come 
ev_04102013_03   038 
 
Example (19) is an excerpt from a political speech – a member of the village government 
emphatically thanks his superior for attending an event. The enclitic =mi is used to convey 
greater intentionality than would be expressed by an unmarked assertion, which would also be 
grammatical in this context. The occurrence of =mi in 1SUBJ clauses is often found in political 
speeches, presumably to increase the argumentative force of utterances.  
Pragmatic effects arise also when =mi is used in 2SUBJ clauses. In TK, 2SUBJ declaratives 
are generally considered rude. This is possibly due to the mismatch between the origo/speaker 
and the primary agent, which in 2SUBJ declaratives corresponds to the addressee. In elicitation, 
my consultants rejected 2SUBJ declaratives and suggested interrogative equivalents instead. 
                                                 
3 A traditional Napo Runa  infusion made with leaves of Ilex guayusa. 
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While TK speakers reject unmarked ‘out-of-the-blue’ 2SUBJ declaratives, 2SUBJ declaratives 
with =mi are considered felicitous:  
 
 
 
(20)  
a.  # Juan,   pantalon-da  liki-ngui       / liki-nga          ra-w-ngui. 
    NAME  trousers -ACC break-2SG   /  break-FUT    AUX-PROG-2SG 
       Intended meaning: Juan, you’ll break your trousers.  
 
 
b.  Juan   pantalon-da  liki-shka. 
 NAME trousers-ACC break-ANT 
 Juan has broken his trousers [I just found out] 
 
 
c.  Juan,   pantalon-da  liki-ngui=mi 
 P.NAME trousers-ACC break-2SG=mi 
 Juan, you’ll beak your trousers! 
elicited 
 
Example (20) Error! Reference source not found.was not considered felicitous, and the 
consultant suggested a 3SUBJ clause in (20) Error! Reference source not found.instead. 
Example (20) was judged felicitous, but only in a context of scolding/ warning a child. A 
similar effect, although associated with a different illocutionary force – of encouragement, is 
shown in (21): 
 
(21)  
A: Mana   usha-ni 
 NEG   can-1SG 
 I cannot (do this) 
 
B:     [kan]  ushan-gui=mi 
         [ 2.PRO] can-2SG  =mi 
 [Yes, you] can! 
attested 
 
Example (21) comes from a conversation in which I uttered (21), claiming I would not be able 
to prepare chicha, to which my friend replied with (21), encouraging me to try. When I asked 
another consultant whether (21) would be felicitous without =mi, it was judged odd and lacking 
argumentative force. 
Pragmatic effects resulting from the co-occurrence of =mi with 2SUBJ are in line with similar 
phenomena attested in epistemic marking systems in other languages. In Wutun (Sinitic, 
China), the egophoric marking co-occurring with 2SUBJ results in performatives (Sandman 
2016). In Tsafiki (Barbacoan, Ecuador, Dickinson 2016) the egophoric marker -yo co-occurs 
with 2SUBJ in scolding contexts, similar to (20) above. As mentioned previously in examples 
(20) and (21) there is a mismatch between the second person agent, who by default has the 
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primary right to know about their own actions,  and the epistemic primacy encoded by =mi, 
which in declaratives is anchored to the speaker. It is plausible that an increase of illocutionary 
force of the utterances cited above is due to this discrepancy in epistemic primacy.  
The effect of using =mi is different in interrogatives, where, as a result of origo shift, =mi is 
anchored to the addressee. Consider:  
 
(22)  
A:    Kan   kulki-ra   mana  chari-ngui=mi  ?  
   2.PRO  money-ACC NEG   have-2SG=mi 
 
B:    Ari,   mana   chari-ni   =chu 
   yes  NEG    have-1SG=Q/NEG 
A:   You don’t have money[, do you]? 
B:   No, I don’t  
el_28112014_005 
 
The exchange in (22) is plausible in a situation where B has previously told A that he didn’t 
have money. Therefore, A’s utterance could be seen as a confirmation question, following up 
on what B had said before. In (22), =mi is anchored to the addressee, who has the epistemic 
primacy with respect to the information A enquires about. In this respect, the interrogative 
utterance of (22), differs from the declarative (21), where =mi is anchored to the speaker.  
The enclitic =mi occurs in interrogatives much less frequently than in declaratives. In his 
description of Quian (Tibeto-Burman), LaPolla states that evidentials are non-obligatory in 
interrogatives, unless the speaker makes an assumption about the addressee’s source of 
information regarding the answer (2003: 73, cited in Bergqvist 2015: 4). Faller (2002) made a 
similar observation for =mi in Cuzco Quechua. This interpretation could also be paraphrased 
to apply to TK, where it appears that =mi is only used in interrogatives if the speaker wishes 
to make an explicit reference to the addressee’s authority to answer the question. In the absence 
of such reference, the ‘default’ polar interrogative marker =chu is used:  
 
(23)  
Kan   kullki-ra   chari-ngui=chu?  
2.PRO  money-ACC have-2SG=Q/NEG 
Do you have money? 
attested 
 
The difference between (22) and (23) is that in the former, the speaker is asking for 
confirmation, while the latter is a request for information. However, =mi can also occur in 
requests for information. Consider the content question in Error! Reference source not 
found.: 
 
(24)  
Ima  shutimi? 
what name=mi  
What is her name? [asked to someone who knows the person in question] 
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in_20092013_03   216 
 
Example (24) was uttered by a person who did not know me, when one of my consultants 
brought me to her house. The use of =mi-marked utterance in this context can be interpreted as 
the speaker recognising the addressee’s epistemic primacy with respect to information about 
the newcomer. Nonetheless, the discourse contexts in which speakers decide to use =mi in 
interrogatives require further investigation. 
4.3.2. =mi in embedded clauses 
In Section 3.2, I have shown examples of =mi embedding under the verb of speech, and under 
the non-factive verb yachin (‘seem-3SG’). In this section, for the reasons of space, I limit the 
discussion of =mi in embedding contexts to its occurrences in the scope of the epistemic modal. 
Consider:  
 
(25)  
[ñuka  yaya    shamu-w        =mi   ]CP   yachi   -n 
 1.PRO     father  come  -PROG=mi      seem    -3 
It seems my father is coming.  
[speaker hears footsteps outside, and was expecting his father to come home] 
el_18092014_01   035 
 
(26)  
Wa....  [urmashkanimi          ]CP       yachin.... 
wa      urma   -shka -ni =mi       yachi   -n 
oh       fall     -ANT  -1=mi    seem    -3 
Oh, I seems I have fallen [while drunk] 
el_18092014_01 57 
 
The consultants most often translate yachin into Spanish with constructions involving non-
factive verbs: ‘it seems’ or ‘I believe’. In other dialects of Quechua, the above utterances would 
not occur with =mi. In (25) Error! Reference source not found.the speaker bases his claim 
on incomplete evidence, and therefore the indirect evidential or – in Cuzco Quechua – the 
marker -chus hina would be appropriate in this context. Example (26) is uttered in a context 
where the speaker is not fully aware of his actions. Aikhenvald reports that in such cases, 
evidential languages often recur to the use of indirect/non-visual evidentiality (2004: chap. 7). 
This is also the case for several Quechan varieties (cf. Weber 1986: 139; Faller 2002: 190), 
where reportative marker is used to mark the speaker’s unawareness of her own actions.  In 
TK, either =mi + yachin or just yachin occurs in those contexts.4 
The above shows that the embedding of =mi under yachin is not compatible with analysing the 
enclitic as marker of certainty, direct evidence, or BPG. As mentioned previously, the speaker 
needs to believe in having the BPG to use the enclitic encoding it and such belief is not 
compatible with embedding under a weak epistemic modal. However, if =mi is analysed as 
marker of epistemic authority – ‘the relative right to know or claim’ – it can be reconciled with 
embedding under yachin. 
                                                 
4 In the 11-hour corpus of naturalistic discourse, 40 tokens of yachin, 25% (n=10) with =mi-marked complements. 
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As mentioned in the previous discussion, epistemic primacy and epistemic certainty belong to 
different dimensions of knowledge. Therefore, cases where the speaker has epistemic primacy 
over the information, but is not willing to assert it with certainty, though marginal, are logically 
possible. In (25)Error! Reference source not found. and (26) above the main point of both 
utterances is the embedded proposition (cf. Papafragou 2006; Krifka 2014), with respect to 
which the speaker claims epistemic authority. Embedding the proposition under a subjective 
epistemic modal (Papafragou 2006) indicates the speaker’s reduced commitment (Krifka 
2014:14). However, it does not affect the speaker’s epistemic primacy.  
Utterance (26) was made in context where the speaker is not fully aware of his actions, 
although, by virtue of being the actor, he does have epistemic authority over them.  Example 
(25) can also be explained in this manner – the speaker does have the epistemic authority to 
talk about his father and his comings and goings, since the father’s habits fall within the 
speakers ‘territory of information’. However, the speaker is not certain whether it is indeed his 
father coming. Therefore, the embedding of =mi-marked claims under yachin could be seen as 
a strategy of ‘epistemic downgrading’ (Kärkkäinen 2003; Heritage & Raymond 2005; Stivers 
et al.  2011).  
5. Summary and conclusions 
In this article, I have argued that in TK, the enclitic =mi should be analysed as a marker of the 
origo’s epistemic primacy, rather than as a direct evidential. I have shown that the enclitic is a 
non-truth conditional marker which can occur in constructions grounded in different sources 
of evidence, and that it cannot be analysed as encoding the origo’s direct evidence/best possible 
ground for making a speech act. However, if =mi is analysed as a marker encoding the origo’s 
epistemic primacy, its distribution can be accounted for. I have also shown that the marker is 
non-truth conditional, and suggested that it can be interpreted as a modifier of illocutionary 
force.  
Tena Kichwa is not the only Quechuan variety in which the speaker’s choice of an ‘evidential’ 
enclitic is grounded not only in mode of access to the information. As mentioned in the 
discussion of evidential systems in other Quechuan languages, several of them have systems 
of five or six markers. All these systems have the ‘standard’ direct, indirect and reportative 
markers. Apart from that, they have markers which encode whether the information is shared 
between the speaker and the addressee. South Concuchos Quechua has markers asserting 
mutual knowledge (=cha:) and indicating a conjecture shared by speech act participants 
(=cher) (Hintz & Hintz 2014). Sihuas Quechua shows the same distinction, and also 
distinguishes between reported information (=shi), and generalised knowledge based on 
reported information (=sha) (Hintz & Hintz 2014). This shows that in certain Quechuan 
varieties, the ‘evidential’ systems are susceptible to the distinction between information which 
is only known to the origo, and the one that is known to both interlocutors. The TK ‘evidential’ 
system seems to be susceptible to similar intersubjective factors – the ‘epistemic primacy’ 
meanings of =mi encodes the fact that the origo has more/better quality information than her 
interlocutor.  
Since TK  is recognised as one of the least ‘conservative’ Quechuan varieties, it is plausible 
that the meaning of =mi in TK has undergone semantic change  from an evidential to an 
epistemic primacy marker. Change from marking the source of information towards marking 
epistemic primacy is in line with the observation made by Traugott and Dasher (2002) who 
recognise ‘intersubjectification’ as a process of grammaticalisation that consists of a gradual 
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development from a subjective perspective, representing the inner states of the speaker, to an 
intersubjective one, incorporating the perspectives of other speech act participants. It has been 
mentioned above that in certain Quechuan dialects the evidential paradigms have markers 
which encode the perspectives of both the speaker and the addressee (Howard 2012; Hintz & 
Hintz 2014). While these systems are labelled as ‘evidential’ by the authors of their 
descriptions, they are clearly intersubjective in nature, and concerned not only with the source 
of evidence, but also with the distribution of knowledge/information between the participants 
of the speech situations. In the light of these descriptions, the analysis of the TK enclitic =mi 
as encoding the origo’s epistemic primacy  rather than the direct evidence/best possible ground 
evidence seems to fit with patterns of semantic change attested both cross-linguistically and in 
other Quechuan varieties.  
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